At the time when Lebanon gained its political independence from the French in 1943, the State of Israel had been created on its borders in 1948, imposing several military, political and economic challenges.

Lebanon received 200 000 Palestinian refugees; most of them were concentrated in the South. Israel never stopped its incursions and interventions on the South of Lebanon, and sought to subjugate the South either directly or by proxy. It never hid its ambitions in lands and waters up to the Litani River. It also did not hide its desire to make Lebanon a state that cooperates with Israel. Therefore it endeavoured, since 1950s, to build security and political relations with some influential personalities and political forces, to reconsider the geography of the Lebanese entity, and national coexistence between its components.

This Israeli project on the Lebanese land was favoured by some quarters that have not abandoned the dream to be connected with the West and Western culture, and that concentrated on their factional identity and tried to make it compatible with the political entity.

When the American active role in the region started to fill the vacuum caused by evacuation of the French and British occupation, through pact projects, some factional forces rejected the "National Charter" and requirements of common co-existence and tried to annex Lebanon to the Western camp, which was confronted, at that time by the Arab nationalism led by Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Lebanon recovered some of its stability after a patriotic movement and a military uprising in the summer of 1959, which culminated by an American- Nasserite settlement that was embodied in a Lebanese regime that was in harmony with the Arab foreign policy, that responded as well to some internal reform demands that strengthened partnership of the Muslims in the State, after being marginal.

However, the equation failed after the June 1967 war, when the factional isolation party tried to revolt against the 1958 settlement and the Arab position of Lebanon, making use of the Arab defeat to deepen the isolation character of Lebanon, and to join the Western policies and expedite settlement with Israel. Lebanon still lives the chapter of these options which are renewed with factional sectors or political forces whenever there is possibility to change the regional climate.

The Christian political team that dominated the government before the Civil War of 1975- 1900, believed that Lebanon's Arab option impaired its position and interests and marginalised its culture and role. This team struggled, using apprehensions and accusation of treason, and cooperated with all international and regional parties to push forward its project. It even risked establishing direct relations with Israel, but it failed in taking Lebanon to where it wanted it to be. It agreed to the Taif settlement in 1989 where international, regional and internal interests crossed, and that was decisive in determining Lebanon's Arab belonging and that its entity belonged to all its sons. A system of factional partnership was established with obvious superiority of the Muslims. Christians did not agree to this equation, and tried to amend it, till the 1559 International Resolution was issued in extension to the American-Western offensive to the region.

That resolution sought to change Lebanon's regional position through amending power balances. The resolution realised some temporary achievements that extended from the end of 2004 to the end of 2008. The international overt political intervention in Lebanon by the United Nations and its resolutions, and the July 2006 war, managed to make a deep cleavage among Islamic factions. The Sunni Muslims   were worried of their position, and apprehended the role of what they called the Iranian Syrian axis and the Shiite crescent. The Shiite Muslims were adamant in their confrontation of what they considered the project of cutting their role to size and changing their demography and punished them for what they have done in resisting Israel. That conflict led to approaching the brinkmanship of a civil war in May 2007 events. The crisis was again internationalised, and there was the Doha's agreement, with Saudi, Syrian, Iranian, Egyptian, Qatari and French partnership, and American implicit support. America at that time was preoccupied with the Presidential Election, power rotation, and political failure which President Bush's policy suffered in the region.

      In the Doha's agreement, authority and constitutional institutions were built on the basis of partnership and consensus, by electing the President of the Republic, forming the government, issuing the election law and running the representative elections. A new page was open in the Syrian-Saudi relations that participated in Lebanon's stability in regards to security and political stability understandings, and retreat of the Western role temporarily to instigate Lebanese factions for more disputes, and escalating controversial issues, including resistance weapons, defence policies and relations with Syria.

New international political features started to emerge with the election of the new President Barak Obama, based on dialogue, negotiation and balance of interests. The West opened again on Syria and partial understandings were reached in hot issues in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. Syria managed to restore its regional role. Turkey was involved in the region's concerns and problems. It actively intervened in many issues which were of interest to it, including stability, and avoiding aggravation of disputes and wars, reluctance to instigate minorities to separate.  Of course participating in Arab World's economics, in the light of the international financial crisis reduced America and Europe's role. But that map has not been established yet.

Israel, for the first time felt that its existence was threatened because of increasing growth of Palestinian population, missile security on its borders (Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in South Lebanon), regional military balance which is represented in Iran and its increasing strength, and potentials of producing a nuclear weapon. Lebanon, on the Israeli point of view constitutes one of the Iranian arms, through the resistance weapon. In spite of the Israel's achievements in its Judaization project and prosecuting the Palestinian people, has been unable to impose a comprehensive political settlement outside a new regional order, in which it will not be the strongest.

America has permanently secured Israel's security and its superiority and has supported its interests and demands. However, in this political moment, America finds itself unable to meet Israel's demands in expanding the scope of war, without avoiding the Iraqi and Afghani consequences. America agrees with Israel on the Iranian issue, but it cannot deal with it by war for the moment. It needs Arab participation that starts with offering concessions in the Palestinian file. Contradiction in priorities creates a crisis in American Israeli relations. Each party deals with it according to its strategic point of view. Most probably each party tries to push its options: Israel's option is war, while America's option is containment of Israeli extremism, containment of the Arab position, and obtaining concessions.

What is called the Arab Moderation axis has been fluctuating between the American pressures to confront Iran as a priority, and dealing with the Palestinian file, as an Arab need, and at the same time facing the Israeli extremism, and steadiness of the "Opposition" axis, and the objection that extends from Lebanon to Iran, across Syria and Gaza, up to the Turkish role. Egypt deals with the Palestinian file as an integral part of its national security, which is true in Gaza, on Egyptian border, and finds in it a kind of Iranian influence. Egypt tries to barter pressure on the Palestinians there, and intervenes in supporting contradictory tendencies in Palestine (Oslo authority) and Lebanon (forces that join Moderate states). Saudi Arabia is nearer in its orientation with that of Egypt concerning regional affairs. However, the Saudis are exposed to pressures concerning its security in the Gulf, between Iraqi and Yemeni crises. It is obliged to directly deal with active players in the political process in both states, together with Syria and Iran, and, to some extent, with Turkey. An understanding was reached in the Lebanese file which reinforced Syria's role as well as in Iraq and Yemen. The Palestinian cause is still controversial as it determines the whole regional system, and is connected with the comprehensive settlement in the region.

Syria, on its part, has resumed its political influence to Lebanon. But this time it did it through strong allies who represented the Shiite faction (the military force) and an important part of Christian representation. It has gained the Druze support lately, and a part of the Sunni street. However, Syria's influence, this time, is not just tools in the authority and the regime, but it works through a regional military and political position that is apparent in the Damascus meeting (between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah) to counter the Israeli threats and declare common alliance, and comprehensive confrontation if Israel committed any aggression. The forces that object the Syrian role are unable to resist Lebanon's involvement in this axis, in spite its efforts to abort it, with external support. It is no secret that "Hezbollah's weapon" has caused a kind of deterrence balance with Israel and that its position on the Lebanese internal arena has become decisive in the defensive and foreign policies. This position reinforces Syria's and Iranian roles, and attracts the Arab Order to accept the new political balance.

Of course the West (America and France in particular), and the "Arab Moderation" have not ceased to support the adverse current in Lebanon or encourage it to resist the new political change, through many shapes of international, political, financial and security support, and through raising issues that have to do with internal weapon or drawing borders with Syria, the International Tribunal, or factional balances. But that will not change anything in the Lebanese map, neither negatively or positively, unless a big breakthrough by war or rebellion. It is obvious that both options are weakened in Lebanon, and cannot be used politically. However, the status quo of keeping all parties concerned may help in building the regional order which the big powers and regional influential powers try to build. In the foreseen future Lebanon will not know political or security stability which relieves it from regional or internal disputes. Today there is a political-security regime that rules Lebanon which is based on the idea of waiting for changes in the external sphere. It is obvious that a limited or partial war in Lebanon is no more feasible for Israel, in spite of some scenarios that the media volunteered to publish. That does not cancel the possibility of such war. It means that it has become more difficult and less powerful to achieve political results, unless it uses options that will change all positions, including the use of mass destruction weapons.

For this specific reason, Israel hesitates between its desire to go into war, and its capacity to shoulder the consequences. These days, it pushes in implementing its original project to expand its geographical sphere across settlements, and extending its security range. It will not abandon the West Bank, the Golan Heights or its security positions in South of Lebanon. It presents its new concept of national security that extends to Iran. It tries to barter the United States to guarantee this security by pushing Washington to take serious and drastic actions against Iran either by besiege or war. This scene indicates that the region will not witness any points of understanding between its influential players in the visible future. It will not be feasible to settle the Palestinian question as an important part of the mission to direct the Arabs' policy towards more conformity with the American plan. Lebanon, in that sense, is the most vulnerable arenas to test a way out of this dilemma, by changing equations. The current crisis may continue till a new American Election takes place, or till the United States recovers the initiative in the financial or military aspects, or if there was an American acceptance of a new international order that reflects on the Middle East, accepting roles of regional states like Iran, Turkey and Syria, and imposing a settlement on Israel with the minimum of Palestinian and Arab rights.

There is nothing that supports this last option, because extremism is not only in the government of Israel, but also in the public opinion tendencies there. It is not easy to change a government to have another that realises the settlement. All what can be expected is that Israel partially and temporarily stops settlements, its control on the West Bank and its siege, for the sake of obtaining more Palestinian concessions in an Arab position that is based on the policy of no-war and no peace?  During that stage Lebanon's economic, social and political crises are deepened, and tenets of national cohesion are weakened between the tense factional groups which are concerned about their destiny. Factional powers' environment is deepened without any possibility of the establishment of a powerful, able and just state.

Lebanon now is administering a government of national unity in which all parties that have won the elections participate and which adopts, in its ministerial statement, a defensive policy that is based on cooperation between "the people, the army and the resistance". The government reflects balances of power more than political orientations of all parties. The defensive policy is still presented on the table of national dialogue which the President of the Republic has called for. Some parties still present the weapon of the resistance, from the angle of its role in the internal equation and its effect on the national life, its regional dimension and the connection of its decision with Syria and Iran. Israel has not ceased to raise the issue of the resistance's weapon. It always threatens Lebanon that it will launch a military action against this weapon. It considers that some of the heavy weapons are making a military imbalance. It has lately raised the issue that "Hezbollah" has been provided with Scud missiles of long range and destructive capability.

      It is definite that the cost of a destructive war is the one which deters Israel to initiate such war. Israel is no more able to protect its society from missiles. What will happen if these missiles had been developed to be able of longer range destruction? However, no one should exaggerate in the size of balance between Israel's capability and that of "Hezbollah". It is essentially wrong to consider war just a military event and a military balance. There are always economic, social and political consequences. Israel has always enjoyed Western support and protection form UN resolutions. It often can decide the date limits of a war.

      For Israel it is not easy to admit the retreat of its role in regional deterrence, or be involved in political negotiations for settlement under the current balance. Its need to change this balance is great. The idea of launching war, even a limited one, is on its agenda. There is a slogan: of two-state solution. In fact America does not have any final conception of this solution. Israel can manoeuvre to a great extent as it did after "Madrid", and after "Oslo". There is a very deep gap between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel has no intention to accept international resolutions, or give up its gains in Jerusalem or the West Bank. Netanyahu has a philosophy to revive the Zionist historical idea about Greater Israel. Peace is still a far reaching idea. The American Administration gradually accepts the Israeli conditions. We may reach a moment when Israel takes the initiative to change the regional condition through a war decision with an American license. Lebanon is on the top objectives, because it inevitably affects Syrian and Iranian roles.

This possibility is present in the minds of some Lebanese forces, when dealing with the State's problems. There is no acknowledgment by all parties that the state exists. In fact the political forces seek to reinforce their influence among their factions and on the geography of these factions. Political battles take place to divide the administration. Some parties had returned back to the idea of non-centralization on a large scale. Lebanon's destiny will be decided though the regional position. But experiences affirmed that the Lebanese interior is basically affected by the demographic factor and strength of one big faction or the other. It is still governed by the Syrian role, because of the geographical position and historical relations. Whenever Israel and the west pressure Lebanon, it strengthens more its relations with Syria, and a greater sector of Lebanese find that their protection is through Syria.

The opportunity to reinforce Lebanon's independence is weakened day after day, and makes Lebanon an arena for regional disputes. That was the experience of the last five years. The main problem that Lebanon faces is weak national consensus. The factional orientations are reinforced to the extent that they constitute a divisional state of affairs. In the absence of a national project and the state's weakness, the ideological identities are strengthened. The political order is heading more towards the federal formula. It is true that Lebanon is too small to be divided as was shown by the civil war, but it does not unify under the factional system and Lebanese groups' concern of hegemony.

During the last two decades, the constitutional reforms which the Taif agreement has introduced, and which could have strengthened the central state. The main reason is that Lebanon stays as a part of the regional dispute. Syria has administered Lebanon by the illusion of continuation of resistance against Israel, and that South of Lebanon should be on the move all the time so that Israel may not impose a strong balance that alienates negotiation with Syria on the Golan Heights. Internal conditions have been created on the basis of the exceptional administration that suits this confrontation. With the Syrian forces' evacuation after the 1959 Resolutions; the political class could not establish new rules to develop the states' nerve. It went to bet on the American project and started confrontation with the resistance and its weapons, and that returned back national division in a deeper way than ever before.

Lebanon has witnessed a noticeable stability on 25 may 2000 by liberating the South and the July 2006 Israeli war. The resistance was performing "reminder" operations in Shebaa and Kafr Shoba hills. The resistance weapons was not of the same volume of today, after it proved its role in the July war, when Syria and Iran reinforced it because it contributed in reversing the balance of power and proved that it was able to create a balance of deterrence. Actually the results of the July war constituted a great support for Iranian and Syrian roles. It gave Syria a new role in the regional equation, and imposed it as a reference to which the western states rush to. The Gaza war at the end of 2008 was an additional element in reinforcing Syria's regional role. The Damascus summit was lately held (meeting of the Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, the Iranian President Ahmadinejad, and the Resistance leader Hassan Nasrallah) to confirm solidarity of these parties in any future war, which confirms the conviction that Lebanon has become a part of this new equation, and that it will not be alone in any coming confrontation. This development constitutes a kind of common defence which helps Lebanon not to be alone vis-a-vis Israel. These data which make Israel more linked with the Middle East crisis, and with security and stability, or rather instability is, on the other hand, a new factor that curbs Israel and the West form making Lebanon a forlorn theatre for chaos. It is obvious that Lebanon's future is connected with what will be decided for all the region of prospects of peace and war, and probably truces in the visible future until the declaration of the results of the Palestinian- Israel- American negotiations.