During public accountability sessions which a British Investigation Committee started in November 2009 about British participation in the war on Iraq in 2003, important matters, backgrounds and secrets were divulged. The most conspicuous was that the decision of war was agreed upon by the American President George Bush and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, one year before the launching of war. In these sessions, Christopher Meyer participated. He was the British Ambassador in Washington in 1996-2003, during the period in which there were preparations for the war. He revealed several related circumstances, such as saying that Tony Blair would have changed the direction of the American policy which was heading for war, had he adopted a candid stand and told the American Administration about the illegality of the war, that there was no international unanimity to support it, and that there was no plan of what to do after the fall of Saddam's regime. That means that a big decision such as war on Iraq in 2003 could have been avoided if one state, such as Britain had adopted a positive policy in that case. This also means that it is legitimate to conclude that if there had been a strong Arab stance against the war, guided by Arab interests, and anticipation of the grave consequences of Iraq's destruction, and the possibility of giving Iran an historical opportunity to expand its influence, or imagining the escalation of currents of extremism, among other things, then the American arrogance would have been harnessed.

There was no solid Arab stance to influence the direction of events in that war, or other wars, as we know. What happened was collective Arab reluctance to have a say in an event that took place in the heart of the Arab region, which had sharp and dangerous repercussions on each one of them for decades to come. This leads us to the big and frustrating question: Why did not the Arabs move? Why did not they defend their interests, and stand against policies that destroy their region and bring them catastrophes? Are the tools and methodology of political analysis benefit us in understanding and realising the continuity of the flagrant Arab deterioration, on each state's level individually and on the Arab region's level collectively?

If we used the perspective of defending a certain ideology, and tried to explore the efficacy of certain ideologies that interprets a certain Arab state, either in adopting certain steps, or negative reluctance to act, that may not help us. There are no established ideologies that represent an effective dynamic that may help an Arab political or ideological activity, either regional or international, and affect the process and orientation of international politics. There has been no Arab nationalism that is adopted by a certain regime or a group of regimes. And there has been no Islamic project that represents an ideology of one or several states that seek to achieve. There has been no "Europeanization or Westernization" project that was led by a state or regime, and dedicated its effort to achieve. There has been also no state that is distinguished with a leading regional ambition, and an international influence ambition that it seeks to achieve by using methods of containment and absorption and expansion of its base. On the contrary, the states that are nominated for leadership (especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria) were successful in creating additional hostilities, and avoiding new alliances. The only exception here was that the regional ambition and the only ideology in the "Arab market" and on an official level was found in "Africanisation", which Libya presented and through which it sought to lead "the United African States". Nevertheless, it was a project that lacked content and realism, and that belonged to fantasy and surrealism, and not real politic.

Prestige pushes states and groups to adopt positive and active policies. States are inclined to defend their regional and international positions and their prestige, and offer sacrifices, and sometimes their material losses are great just to maintain their regional and international presence and their contributions in international politics. That is why some states adopt policies and contributions in issues that seem irrelevant, or support issues that do not constitute a direct threat or interest of the concerned state. On the regional level there is competition between states that are almost equal in power and potentials to gain regional leadership. This competition may reach a violent and military level and contributes in launching wars.

Why do not Arab states defend their "interests", "ideologies" or "prestige", individually or collectively, and leave the door of probabilities open?  Why strategic planning shrinks in most Arab states to the minimum, and its concern is only to concentrate on instantaneous political moments, and are monitored by small businessman' mentality and not of that of big ones? Why the Arab states and regimes surrender the region as well as their interests and policies, and give them to their regional competitors, and even to international ones, without doing the minimum of what they could have done? Of course there are limits of the capacity and the cards that can be used. No one can ask any Arab state to make the impossible in political action. However, what is required is to use the available capabilities, and no more.

When the classical analysis tools cannot provide us with answers to direct questions, in case of Arab deterioration and strange reluctance to use self capabilities, then we are facing a destructive case of "self marginalisation" that is led by non-national agendas. Such agendas mean that the regimes and government are exhausted and are not in service of their homelands. They are meant to achieve other agendas that have to do with the ruling elites such as dedicating the ruling grip, or securing political inheritance, or maintaining family, tribe or party rule and amending the Constitution to guarantee all that. In addition there is another phenomenon which is political, diplomatic and administrative flabbiness in most Arab states, as decision-making is confined to the first responsible person and his entourage. That means that the Ministries of Planning and Foreign affairs, with all their different circles, diplomats, experts and ambassadors, do not have a real role to play. That leads to frustration and indifference in their circles. Decision-making is done through high levels, and only a very limited number of close advisers participate in that process. Regionally speaking, if we think over what the Iranian, the Turkish, and the Israeli policies do, we realise that the scene is very frustrating, in comparison with the applied and collective Arab impotence. These three states have spent all nights to draw regional strategies that support their presence and leadership abilities, while the Arab states fell asleep on pillows of lethargy and impotence

The second key to dismantle this puzzling and destructive enigma is the clash of popular will and public opinion with dictatorship and totalitarianism which do not allow the popular will to have any influence on the political decision, or even use  and benefit of  it. In Israel, Netanyahu and his rightist government are adamant on marginal issues such as freezing settlements, using the public opinion and voters as a justification of their stance. Iran uses the same justification in its argument with the West in regard to its nuclear file, pretending that the Iranian public opinion is mobilized towards the government insistence of its stand, and that the Iranian leadership cannot clash with the people. In Turkey as we have seen lately, Rajab Tayeb Ardogan used the popular temperament and the public opinion as an excuse to cancel Israel's participation in military manoeuvers with Turkey and the United States, arguing that he could not ignore the Turkish anger against Israel after its war on the Palestinians in Gaza. In the Arab world there is no real respect for the popular will, or even a pragmatic use of it. The Arab public opinion was weakened and the efficacy of the "Arab street" was destroyed to a great extent, and has become a laughing stock with no one taking it seriously. The message which has been conveyed to all political parties in the world, both states and organisations, was that the Arab governments do not care for their peoples' opinion, and that they can follow any policy that is endorsed by the dominating elite. Of course that message was welcome by others who found it easier to deal with non-democratic governments that do no have to refer to parliaments or accountability mechanisms before taking their political and strategic decisions and options.

Thus the Arab region became a political common property or no-man's land, which provides adventurers with unexpected opportunities and options. Therefore the Arab reaction, either individually or collectively, has been always least counted. An accumulated international experience has been unfortunately been fixed that the Arab reaction does not practically have an influence on the process of any policy or political or even military change which a certain party may make in the Middle East, and which may affect the Arab states.

In the Arab context, we may exaggerate if we ask or expect that the big Arab states would have the same effectiveness and contribution in the international field,  that are equal to that of the United States, Britain or Spain. But it is not acceptable that the Arab role and effectiveness is equal to that of a small state such as the Benin republic, Suriname or Albania. It is expected of the big Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Morocco and Emirates to be on the same political activity and effectiveness of states such as Brazil, India, Mexico and Israel. In the context of making and drafting world policies, either in economy, environment, armament, etc, states are affected by the conclusions of these policies according to their sizes, the volume of their populations and their economies. Therefore they are keen to have an important share in decision-making. As for the states that do not struggle enough to secure participation in decision-making they forsake their national interests in a way, and face direct and future losses. Interrelations of interests and overlapping of local, regional and international policies push different states and powers to try to influence the process of policies and orientation that initially seem to be geographically or interest-wise far away of them. There are many experts, who work in departments that deal with the Middle East in headquarters of the European Union in Brussels and Luxemburg. They wonder of the amazing Arab absence, not only to influence policies of the Union in general, as do the rest of big and medium states, but also to influence policies relating to the Middle East itself.

On the regional level, Arab action and effectiveness, in formulating the regional and local policies that directly affect the future of their region and countries, are dwarfing. They show striking impotence and indifference. From Palestine to Iraq to Afghanistan, Arabs resign almost completely leaving the decision in these three hot issues in the hands of big powers which decide and execute according to their interests. This is as if what is going on now and what will develop in the future are of no significance to the Arab states. There are other issues concerning war in Somalia, Darfur and the Western Sahara and the destiny of "Tawariks" and their tragedy. If we compare Iranian and Turkish efficacy and activity on the region's level, and in pure Arab issues such as Palestine and Lebanon, we find that the size of Arab political self-marginalisation, impotence and indifference seem more catastrophic.

There are two levels of stances and movements: "Arab stances" and "Arab movements" towards any issue that is regionally or internationally presented. There are stances that are specific for each Arab state individually. These stances represent the self interest of each state. However, the pragmatic assumption here suggests that states that belong to a certain geographical region have space of common interests that exceed the space that exists with other states and blocs, or at least are of the same importance. Therefore it is assumed that there is a minimum of effectiveness and concern to defend these common interests.

However, the states that belong to the Middle East are defined by their national interests only, and each state is competing with other neighbouring states to achieve these national interests without giving heed to any other considerations. This is not new of course, and this is what happens today, but it is unable to clarify the impotence, indifference and negligence of vital interests.

The current international position presents new and important opportunities that avail the development of a collective or individual Arab development, if the required political wills are provided. The world today is changing to multi-poles and the American hegemony on international politics and a mono pole is fading. With the continuous rise of China and increasing roles of other states such as Russia and India, the areas of manoeuver, alliances and use of cards become easier. In the United States itself there are transformations that cannot be ignored, not only due to the advent of Obama, but also in the development of an internal awareness concerning the definition of the relationship with Israel. There is an escalating internal American debate on the necessity to revise the definition of this relationship from "special" to "normal". Distinguished politicians and writers present this issue with unusual nerve, like Brent Scowcroft in his book that was recently issued: "America and the World", as well as Patrick Tyler in another book titled "A World of Troubles: America in the Middle East", where he criticised Israel saying that it is high time that the United States should impose its vision of peace in the region on Israel, and should stop yielding its regional policies to Israel's will and desires. Adding to that, the deterioration of Israel's world image, in a disgraceful way after its war on Gaza, provides opportunity for Arab and Palestinian investment. On the European level, there are also transformations such as the increase of European demands for adopting European policies that are independent of the American influence. Also one should not forget the international financial and economic crisis which weakened the Western economies and availed the Arab oil money, specifically, a broader space of great influence. But, we may ask again: up to when the Arabs insist to be self-marginalised for themselves and their role in the world of today and in their own causes?