Sudan faces great challenges at present and in its visible future. These challenges become more complicated when the referendum date on self-determination for the South approaches, as it will be held in January 2011.
Sudan is no exception of the efforts of great powers that seek to re-draw the political geographical map for the Middle East. American occupation of Iraq, and Israeli practices in Palestine are only a practical proof that these strategic plans to control the region, either by partition of some states, including Sudan and Iraq, or by devouring Palestinian lands in favour of Israel, and making it a principal power in the Near East, and using all economic, political or media methods, with the military force of these powers, with USA on the top, to weaken Arab solidarity and common Arab action.
Sudan has a relative advantage as it is the largest African state in size. However, this advantage has become a heavy burden, for several factors, such as having nine neighbouring states, with continuing disputes between their tribes. Some neighbouring states and great powers do not favour that Sudan remains unified, and as one central government whether unified or federal. They covet the materials and development potentials in Sudan's big area. Therefore they directly or indirectly encourage the partition of Sudan to two or three states under flamboyant, albeit vicious, slogans.
These regional and international powers seek to interfere in Sudan's internal affairs, under claims to support some ethnic, religious and tribal groups that do not get equal share of wealth and authority or human and economic development, and are deprived of human or political rights, on equal footing with those who live in Khartoum or around it.
Some foreign civil society organisations have branches in some regions on the peripheries of Sudan, and they indirectly help other similar organisations which concentrate on highlightening all what is negative, using advanced criteria to judge underdeveloped regions and societies. These criteria, if applied on the African states, will not show that such states are better than Sudan, and they maybe worse. However, the central government in Khartoum is blamed of negligence. The developed states and their non-governmental organisations should offer assistance for human, social and economic development, instead of encouraging rebellion, partition and destructive wars.
We shall focus on some important issues about Sudan, and the challenges it faces which may affect its future and its relations with neighbours.
First – American policy towards Sudan
Such policy towards Sudan, either by Clinton Administration or that of Bush Jr. had a great impact on Sudan, on both internal and international level through the United Nations and international forums. The United States applied the baton and carrot policy. The baton is used in more cases by Clinton and Bush, while President Obama used both baton and carrot in a balanced way, as his policy is based on resort to dialogue.
In Bush Administration, the Nifasha agreement for comprehensive peace between South and North and Sudan was reached, with collaboration of EGAD group, and with insignificant contributions by the Arab states. That was done deliberately by the United States and Europe, and was also due to the fact that the Arab states did not care to insist. That agreement caused a great alteration in the direction of the Sudanese civil war which lasted for 20 years. The South was categorically given the right of self determination, to be held specifically on 9 January 2010 that is after six years of signing the Nifasha agreement in 2005.
The agreement has been based on the idea to transform Sudan to a federal state with two regimes: one in the North and another in the South. The people of South Sudan are the ones who have to choose either to stay under the umbrella or gain independence.
The Nifasha agreement is general and elastic in some of its articles, which helps open the door for many interpretations, on application, either by the Sudanese parties in case of dispute, or by regional and international powers. It also avails the opportunity to practice pressures on one party or the other, through the media or internet, aid agencies and some civil society organisation, including the international alliance to save Darfur which is connected with Zionist and American orientations, together with some Afro-American organisations that support African rights against the North which is overwhelmed by Sudanese of Arab or mixed origins.
American Administrations have used all available pressures to push the Sudanese government to be in harmony with American policies, and to curb Chinese existence in Sudan. These Administrations often seek to establish an alternative regime which is in favour of American security interests. The current government in Sudan is classified as a resort for terrorists, especially in the years after the military coup in 1989, and during 1999s. Also there are the economic interests as Washington is apprehended of giving China a lion’s share in exploring oil in Sudan.
There are contradictions in American stances in Darfur, and it seems that there are contradictory stances inside the American Administration, between the State Department, the Congress and CIA. It looks as if it is a deliberate practice to leave all options open, to apply the policy of baton at one stage, and that of carrot at another stage, and use both of them in a third stage. The American media has expressed this discrepancy in covering the Sudanese affairs. May be the reason is to create a state of confusion between the conflicting Sudanese parties and preventing them from adopting a unified stance.
During the American Presidential Election, there were intransigent trends against Sudan and President Bashir. But when President Obama assumed power, and after his speech in Cairo University in June 2009, there was a kind of balance, and a distribution of roles between the State Department which adopted an intransigent stance and the US National Security Council which advocated dialogue and understanding, based on the fact that the Bush Administration’s policy did not achieve the required positive results, and on the contrary was counter productive.
An American envoy, Mr. Scott Grishin, was appointed to Sudan, and he adopted a moderate stance. He started by organising intensive and continuous meetings with all concerned parties, and advocated objectives based on participation and work with both the South and the North to solve problems between them, and to unify the rebellious movements in Darfur to facilitate negotiations with them, in collaboration with neighbouring centuries specially Egypt, Libya, Chad, Ethiopia and other states that support settlement, especially Qatar, together with other international parties, including China, France, Russia and Britain. Each one of these states has interests and ambitions in Sudan, together with influence that is compatible with their interests.
The American envoy Scot Grishin showed encouraging penchants to the Sudanese government to positively proceed in the negotiation process and confidence building. He said that there were no mass genocide in Darfur, and were no convincing evidences that the Sudanese government supported terrorism. That statement made the State Department strongly pressure Grishin, and some pressure groups demanded to dismiss him. He tried to compromise the intransigent tendency by supporting what he called imposing smart sanctions on Sudan.
The new American policy towards Sudan can be summarised as follows:
1- Giving an active role to the American and Sudanese diplomatic and technical organs in dealing with the current and suspended issues.
2- Dealing with the regime in Sudan, instead of rejecting it.
3- Holistically dealing with Sudan problems, i.e. not separating the South problems from Darfur crisis or dealing with terrorism, religious currents and all activists.
4- Striking a balance in the American demands towards the central government and the South Sudan government. Both should be committed to the peace agreement, priorities to settle disputes, capacity building, transparency, accountability and not depending all the time on the central government in Khartoum.
5- Concentrating on dealing with the main influential political forces, at present, (which are the National Congress ruling party, the Popular Movement to Liberate Sudan in the South, and the main movements in Darfur), and not to focus on the traditional parties and forces such as Umma Party led by Sadek al-Mahdi), National Democratic Alliance led by Mohammed Osman Mirghan, Popular Congress Party led by Hassan Al-Turabi, or the Communist Party led by Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud. However, Washington had not prevented or cut off relations with them
The United States had shown great interest in helping to prepare the last Sudanese elections, which took place on 11-15 April 2010 to elect the President, the Parliament and governors of the provinces, local councils and the government of South Sudan. The ruling party favourably responded to all the American demands, because it was ready for these elections more than any other parties. It has won on several levels: President Bashir, the Parliament and Provinces' governors, and the People Liberation Movement, led by Silva Kiir, in the South
Washington was concentrating on the peace agreement between the North and the South, and the settlement of Darfur crisis. One of the American objectives is not to allow Sudan to be a haven for terrorists and extremists. The Americans do favour that Sudan would return back to more destructive civil wars as Somalia, with negative effects on the American oil interests in both Libya and Chad. That will depend to a great extent on the result of the referendum of self determination in the South in January 2011, with all its events and consequences.
Secondly –The South of Sudan's Problem
The roots of the problem dated back to the 1956 when Sudan became independent. Since that date there have been tension and wars between the North and South. The reasons were attributed to feelings of marginalization in the South, and its unequal share in authority, wealth and development. In 1980s the central government in Khartoum declared the application of Islamic Jurisprudence (Shari'a) on all provinces of Sudan which was the main reason for war.
The North and the South signed the Nifasha agreement for comprehensive peace in January 2005, in collaboration with the neighbouring states and international powers, and under their pressures sometimes. It stipulated that there would be a referendum for self determination for the South in 2011, and that its result would be accepted (either to continue the union or be separated).
There are several regional and international parties and a number of civil society organisations working in Sudan which favour separation. The main Sudanese parties either insist that the referendum should take place without any obstacle, or that unity should be maintained. The ruling party declares its commitment to the peace agreement and referendum. There are problems between the South and the North concerning drawing borders and determining the regions of oil wells. Troubles erupt from time to time between tribes about pastoral areas, or about sharing oil revenues.
Although there are several local, regional and international parties which expect independence according to the referendum, there are some very important challenges that face separation such as conflicts between tribes, foreign debts, and division of waters between the North and the South together with the fate of Jonglei Canal project. (The project started in 1978 and about 70% of the project was accomplished. It stopped in 1983 due to the civil war).
It is required that a multilateral effort by the League of Arab States, or bilateral efforts by states to support the North and South of Sudan and offer assistances and projects for maintaining unity, or at least avoid a destructive civil war in the South.
Thirdly- Darfur Crisis
There is a connection between the Darfur crisis and the problem of South of Sudan, with different elements for each. The Darfur crisis escalated when the Southern Sudanese managed to acquire rights in sharing authority, wealth and the right to self determination. In these problems, the regional and international roles have been influential and there was intervention in Sudanese affairs.
Practically the roots of Darfur crisis dated back to a long time when droughts had their destructive impact on pastoral areas, the main income of tribes, and when those tribes of Arab origins used to approach farms of other tribes of African origins. That led to military clashes and none accepted compromise as before. There have been also political dimensions after the division that happened in the Salvation Movement when it assumed power in 1989, and when the Southerners got the right of self determination. Several political movements had various demands in Darfur about sharing power, wealth and development. That opened the door for regional and international interventions and supplies of arms and money to these movements. That coincided with intransigency in the American and other foreign stances against the ruling regime and against its leader to the extent of declaring accusations by the International Criminal Tribunal.
More complications were added to the Darfur crisis with increasing numbers of refugees suffer and live on what is offered by international agencies. A great number of them went to neighbouring countries especially Chad and were a burden and caused tension with Sudan that culminated by severing diplomatic relations with Sudan and exchanging accusations of encouraging rebellious groups. Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League condemned the Movement of Justice and Equality of Darfur, which was supported by Chad, for its offensive and for trying to make a coup against Khartoum in 2008, and called it a terrorist act. They declared their support of Sudan against any aggression that targets its security, stability and territorial integrity.
The UN secretary General, UN Security Council, African Union, European Union, and even the United States supported Sudan and condemned the offensive perpetuated by the Darfur Movement of Justice and Equality.
However, an agreement of appeasement was reached between Chad and Sudan, and they resumed diplomatic relations. There was a state of calm on the borders and rebellious activities came to a halt across the borders, and efforts were made to return refugees back to their homes. That helped to have a relative tranquility in Darfur before the last elections in Sudan on 11-15 April 2010.
The Arab League, the Islamic Conference Organization and the African Union and many other Arab and international parties exerted great efforts to reconcile between rebellious movements in Darfur to unify their stances in Doha, Qatar. Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Qatar made intensive good offices and efforts, but the crisis is still there, and there is concentration now on Abuja agreement and it is completed with Doha negotiations to make a breakthrough in the settlement process.
Fourthly – The Crisis in the International Criminal Tribunal
The Darfur crisis was a challenge for Sudan and its regime led by President Omar al-Bashir. For instance the UN Security Council adopted about 26 resolutions about Darfur, and transformed it to an international crisis. It was complicated more when the General Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal Luis Moreno Ocampo accused al-Bashir, in July 2008, of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and mass genocide against three tribes of African origins in Darfur. The case was submitted to the Security Council on the basis that the positions in Darfur threatened international peace and security, which was not an objective diagnosis, and which had a political character, because the crisis almost affected Chad and not all neighbours. The aim was to overthrow al-Bashir in a very delicate stage of Sudan's history. That raised question marks on the International Criminal Tribunal and to what extent the great powers intervene in its work. That is why the majority of the African states and all the Arab states did not seriously take the accusations against a President who enjoyed immunity. The stances of the Security Council and its Western circles raised doubts, as they should have worked hard to find a political settlement of the Darfur crisis based on development, social and economic outlets.
In spite of the fact that President al-Bashir renewed his legitimacy by winning the last Sudanese elections by approximately 69% of votes, the accusations against him will remain as a weapon that can be used against him at any time according to international powers' wish and interests, in the light of developments that will be caused by the self determination referendum in Southern Sudan in January 2011. The Security Council will be able to adopt a resolution to postpone the case or raise it anew according to the developments of the Darfur crisis; especially there are favourable conditions for Sudan-Chad reconciliation.
To conclude, Sudan is passing through a decisive stage fraught with great internal, regional and international efforts that require intensive and extraordinary efforts by the Sudanese government and cooperative neighbouring states, and by the Arab states as represented by its Arab League or individually, to overcome the bottleneck through which Sudan has to pass, and which threatens it of division, renewed wars and troubles.