Success of Non-Arab regional powers that activate, influence and escalate their effects on the Arab region, to the extent of reaching the stage of hegemony on their policies, is not only attributed to their activity, dynamic and movement to influence strategic objectives, realise historical ambitions, but also to Arab policies' negativity and absence, and their readiness to abandon the arena in favour of great powers. Such policies aspire to stabilise their positions and protect their regimes. In addition, these states estimate that it is difficult to achieve their objectives in the region and contain their problems with their Asian neighbourhood, in regard to maintaining stability, overcoming crises, withdrawal of or increasing of their forces, and giving a momentum to the peace process without identifying the leverage and status of the non-Arab regional powers, on the basis of their strong existence on the arena and their effective impact on the region's issues.

In spite of the fact that these regional powers move in the region according to conflicting objectives, contradictory interests and competitive policies, it is evident that all their stances are based on the same motives, as follows:

First: The desire to fill the vacuum caused by Arab absence in strategic issues and regional space. They depend on escalating their roles and spreading their influence in the region on the basis of military pressure, ideological expansion and political and doctrinal marketing.

 Secondly: Each one of them moved on the arena according to a strategy that aimed at obtaining recognition of a leading role as an influential regional power and  a main party that its interests should be respected, and to participate in taking important decisions.

Thirdly: There is consensus between the three powers on their view of the Arab world from a perspective that is based on superiority and condescension. This is ascribed to historical reasons, and to a sense of distinction by these states in regard to their cultures and civilizations, and also to overwhelming national pride, as a consequence of their achievements in the political, economic, developmental and military spheres in their countries, compared with stagnant, disruptive and sometimes deteriorating positions in the Arab world.

Fourthly: The three powers belong to religions, doctrines and cultural terms of references which each one pretends to represent, or aspire to represent. Israel pretends to represent the world's Jews in justifying its historical pretensions and occupational practices on the Palestinian lands. Iran alleges its representation of Shiite communities and resistance movements for marketing its policies that aim at its regional expansion to wherever Shiites or national resistance forces exist. Turkey, on its part, feels the desire to revive the so-called new Ottomanism, and to invest its previous position as the last vestige of Islamic Sunni Caliphate to expand its influence on the region, to strengthen its position in applying for European Union's membership, or for creating an alternative in its regional environment, if its efforts failed to join Europe.

In spite of escalation of the influence of non-Arab regional powers in the region, and the increase of their policies' influence on Arab issues, in such a way that it has become difficult to move any problem of these issues, either to form a government or achieve a reconciliation or progress in a peace process, without their consent. It is clear that the factors that enable these powers to perform their role in the arena is dependant on the nature of complicated, conflicting and competitive relations between them, and on ties of each one with the region's states, and on their relations with great powers, and to what extent they seek to exchange services and interests with them, or their ability to obstruct their objectives. All these factors are evident in the following:

First: Relations between Iran and Israel that are charachterised with hostility, as a result of Israeli sensitivity of the Iranian Islamic regime and its policies and slogans that are against Israel. In addition, there is its "pretentious" feeling of the threat imposed by the existence of the Iranian Nuclear project. However, Iranian realisation that Israel is an obstacle against its Islamic project in the region, and against realising its regional ambitions, and developing its nuclear project, do not prevent both parties from benefiting of each other's stances in gaining the positions that it wants in the American, Islamic and Arab arenas, or adopting "identical" stances in rejecting the American pressures to freeze the Israeli settlement process on the occupied Palestinian lands, on one hand, and enriching Iranian Uranium abroad, on the other hand. Each one of them is also keen to project itself as a prey that is threatened. One justifies its practices in occupation, settlement as obstructing peace efforts, while the 0ther presents itself as a peaceful state that is exposed to pressures of arrogant powers that seek to subjugate it and deprive it of the ability to develop itself.

Secondly: The tripartite equation between Turkey, Iran and Israel is generally characterised with complexity and overlapping in approaching the region's problems. The Turkish dictionary depends on the vocabulary of interest, stability and prosperity. The Iranian dictionary, on the other hand, depends on concepts of assault, confrontation and opposition. The Israeli dictionary is depends on practices of violence, deterrence and excessive power. However, the strategic relations between Turkey and Israel has been affected by the Turkish government's orientation in deepening its relations with the Arab world, return to its cultural and Islamic  heritage in the region, its public opinion's rejection of Israel's practices in the occupied lands, and its war on Gaza. That deprived Israel of any regional alliances, for the first time since its creation. Adding to that, is Turkey's interest to develop its relations with Tehran, in the framework of its dream to establish a new regional order that encompasses Iraq, Iran and the Gulf states to fill the regional vacuum that resulted from American negligence, European weakness and Arab absence. This avails Turkey the opportunity to invest it in appeasing wild Iranian policies, and using it in escalating its role in American estimation. However, the positive developments that the Iranian and Turkish relations witness do not conceal the Iranian concern of Turkey's role in mediation between Syria and Israel, the American support of this role, and the endeavour to escalate it in the competition with the Iranian role, and in using it to keep Syria away of its alliance axis with Iran.

Thirdly: great powers' appreciation of the non-Arab regional powers have fluctuated between considerations of alliance, friendship and competition, but it is not void of differences in opinion or stances. While the United States completely supports Israel, Israeli policies seem as if they do not care much of putting its great ally in an awkward position, to the extent of withdrawal of its declared stances or defend Israeli practices that have been proved by international investigations. This happens when American Iranian relations seem as if they suffer from an acute case of competition and pulling back and forth. However, it is evident that these relations do not reach the stage of cutting down the thin rope that is stretched between them. This is due to the appreciation of each party of the other party's importance in achieving its own objectives. These objectives are: an American recognition of Iran's regional role in the region, and what Iran can offer to America concerning the "basket of incentives" in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, in addition to securing oil supplies in the Gulf. The Iranian Nuclear Programme may be solved by passing over the "threshold" that separates scientific ability from real possession of the nuclear weapon. As for the Turkish American relations, it is apparent that there is a great American confidence in Turkey in assuming a leading prominent role in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Turkey is qualified for it, because of its democracy, its involvement in the modernization project, and its success in reaching balances between religion and politics, science and faith, individual and collective identity, its effective role in Nato, together with its endeavour to cooperate with different trends in Europe, and combine positive dealings with Russia, and active movement towards the Balkan regions, Caucasus and the Black Sea. Chilly relations between Turkey and Israel do not cause concern in official American circles, as they know there are limits in their strategic relations which both parties are keen not to go beyond. However, what concerns some of these circles is that the present Turkish government may have a hidden Islamic ideological agenda that is hidden behind its publicized activity to develop national interests on the region's arena.

Fourthly: Relations between non-Arab regional powers and Arab states are overwhelmed by suspicion and misgivings, due to the nature of the explosive issues in the arena. That is not only due to the fact that the development of relations between Israel and the states that recognised it, are not only determined according to internal interactions, but according to the circumstances that surround the Palestinian issue. Also, the Arab Moderate states that ally with the American Administration adopt a policy that is spontaneously cross with the Israeli policy, either in regard to the siege of the Palestinian resistance, or to the endeavour to cut the Iranian role to size. Therefore the Arab Iranian relations are overwhelmed by concern and lack of confidence, as a result of Arab suspicion of the Iranian influence's escalation, and the Iranian nuclear project's reflections on the security of the region's states. At the same time, Iran is surprised because of Arab's rejection to directly talk with it, and Arab response to Israeli endeavours to label Iranian role as "devilish", and to show Iran's opposed movements against American and Israeli domination in the region, as if they constitute a threat to the Arab states. The opposite happens with the Turkish role which has the Arab side's confidence, and which projects itself as an effective regional power, supported by the tenets of "soft force" by which it wisely and rationally seeks to unite rows, reach consensus and establishing alliance that are compatible with safe objectives. Nevertheless, the Arab arena is not void of doubts about the Turkish movements, whether they are an expression of a serious desire in its orientation towards the region, or that as a tool of pressure and bargain, in order to achieve its main ambition to join the European Union.

It goes without saying that the non-Arab regional powers work for hegemony on Arab issues, investing in that their possession of a political and ideological project which targets to put them on the status of a great regional power. What encourages them to go ahead in their movements is that the United States has loosened its grip on balance in the region, as a consequence of pulling out its force from the Asian arena, the retreat of its influence in the Arab Israeli dispute, and the declining of its effect on the developments in Iraq. This happens when the Arab policies left the whole region to the super power to take care of, and gave a carte blanche delegation of power to move on their behalf. That led to crystalisation of interactions in the regional arena which is not in favour of Arab issues, and which have reflections on the following:                                  

First: The strategic problems were taken away of the Arab framework, and were put in the sphere of influence and control of regional ambitions.

Secondly: The strategic issues started to move in isolated islands, and independent circles which lack common coordination, and are not linked with political or struggle considerations, and none of them are affected by the development of events in other issues, and do interact with them only in favour of non-Arab external interests.

Thirdly: The Arab states lack the leverage of influence on international and regional policies, and the great powers are reassured that the Arab states' stances are weak and do not enjoy much leverage, and that expose them to respond to more external pressures, without concern of official or popular reactions, especially in the light of their allegation that they are able to control internal position and harness the masses' feelings.

Fourthly: Escalation of the factional and ideological divisions in the region's arena, considering them as a natural consequence of political circumstances. Some of them are internal, that have to do with the absence of democracy, which allows local ambitions and greed to use ideological hostility and factional strife. Other political circumstances are external that have to do, in most parts, with the role of foreign powers, especially regional ones, in reviving these divisions, and using them to achieve their objectives.

Accordingly, the image of the Arab world seemed as if it was a prey of re-structuring the region which takes place outside its calculations and assessments, in the light of adaptation of the Arab policies in a limited and selfish way towards the developments that the regional arena witnesses. This reflects the different Arab states' stances in that regard. Some of these Arab states have absolutely isolated themselves from the region's problems, and concentrated on deepening their relations with the EU member states, and other Arab states have found an alternative of their Arab alliances in concentrating on the African continent. A third part of the Arab states gave up their Arab commitments and referred them to the United States to take care of, and are content to have strategic ties with Washington. They have done that to be able to face their internal conflicts, their border skirmishes or their financial crises. In addition, some "national" Arab states adopted policies that are based on re-formulating a new Middle East where Iran and Turkey have a prominent and effective role at the expenses of the Arab Order.

So, while the policies of the non-Arab regional powers actively and vividly move to determine volumes and weights in the region, and to achieve their historical ambitions, on their arena, the Arab policies started to limit their movement in a closed tripartite framework: a morbid concern of the concept of sovereignty of the state, complete negligence of collective requirements of their common interests and national security, spending all the time and efforts in re-constructing the internal positions to secure transfer of authority in the desired direction, and in involving the public opinion in inter-Arab battles about small issues that have destructive reflections on inter-Arab relations and on the concepts of dealing and bases of solidarity between them.