After the Saudi King’s visit to Damascus (October 2009) optimism prevailed among many people who hoped that Saudi Arabia and Syria would reach soon an integrated Arab strategic vision, to be followed by practical policies to avoid ever-increasing risks that threaten the Arab Order as a whole as well as different individual states.
In this framework, it is important to discuss the future of inter-Arab relations, as an introduction to deal with escalation of regional and international challenges. It goes without saying that to establish the basis for an Arab role will be only possible if the Arab states move in a framework that reflects a reasonable degree of solidarity and common coordination.
Even if some people truly say that revival of the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian triangle is nor more sufficient in itself as a mechanism to lead the Arab Order, or that the competence of this axis has practically terminated since the Lebanon war in Summer 2009, that does not belittle the importance of studying the positions of the interrelations between the parties of this axis, at least because these three states are most influential in the Arab Order context. That influence becomes negative when these three states differ and it is positive when they are in accord.
In spite of that, it is still correct that there is no Arab state today that can solely shoulder the Arab Order’s burden due to spread of elements of material and moral strength between its units. Consequently this leads to a spread of the leadership function between several states. This is sometimes expressed that in the Arab Order there are some states that enjoy a special leverage or they represent a centre of weight and influence, either by being able to persuade other states to comply to their orientations, or to prevent these states from blocking such orientations.
It seems that absence of a leading state will remain one of the inter-Arab relations problems. It is expected, as well, that Arab balances that exist in each Arab region will persist. Making each region (the Arab Gulf, the Arab Mashrek (East), the Central and South region, and the Arab Maghreb (West) has its own central state. To solve this problem one can depend on endorsing a formula of regional integration on the Arab level, meaning that each state has to assume a role in creating links in the Arab relations according to every state’s potentials and circumstances. What is important is to reach a consensus on roles, to distribute these roles and integrate them within the Arab interactions as an alternative to the absence of the leading state.
There are legitimate questions that can be presented here: What is the possibility of witnessing an end to the conflict between Arab roles? To what extent the current Saudi-Syrian rapprochement constitutes a step forward in this direction. What effect will this rapprochement produce on inter-Arab relations? What is the impact of this apparent disintegration of the Arab Order on chances to reach Arab reconciliations in the future?
It is sure that the study of Saudi-Syrian relations and the possibility to develop them cannot be separated from their comprehensive Arab context which is currently governed by three main features: The fist feature is resumption of talk on (partial) Arab reconciliations since the 21st Arab Summit in Doha in March 2009. But as usual such reconciliations have been limited and fragile as they were a response to individual efforts not institutional actions. They do not reflect reaching a common vision to face grave challenges. Also some reconciliatory efforts have not been completed such as the Egyptian-Qatari reconciliation. Others dealt with a “conflicting language” as happened with Libyan- Saudi reconciliation.
The second feature is connected with the general pattern of the inter-Arab relations that is based on: moving from solidarity to conflict, in a systematic way in direction, albeit fluctuating in speed. It may be due to the fact that inter-Arab conflicts were always dealt with through the logic of appeasement and not solution or even settlement. Even this appeasement usually happened to face an external danger, and when it is over, Arab contradictions started to emerge once more.
The third feature refers to the media which bump up inter-Arab conflicts due to inferior professionalism of many media men who resort to something similar to "military mobilisation". Honest people were extremely worried because of the media campaign that raged between Egypt and Algeria which exposed a hidden conflict that no one expected to emerge by a football match. That added another reason for Arab conflicts and mobolised the masses for an imaginary battle.
Now we practically deal with the Saudi-Syrian rapprochement process by reading the context, steps and ramifications on inter-Arab relations:
Arab frustration of the new American President Barak Obama's stance towards the region, and his failure to pressure Israel, in spite of his promises to change.
Return of Benjamin Netanyahu as a prime minister which constitutes an important challenge that may push Arab states to the path of solidarity and collective action.
The positive impact of the new Turkish orientation in the region that seeks to create a regional political and security mechanism to curb disputes and reduce foreign interventions in the region's affairs.
The case of "vacuum of power" in the Arab Mashrek which both the United States and Israel seek to invest in increasing disintegration of Arab societies and regions. This position availed and opportunity to escalate the Iranian role and to deteriorate Arab Mashrek's issues (in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine).
Development or change of the shape of the threat that endangers the Arab region and its strategic neigbourhood. Threats have developed a clear internal dimension which will finally lead to deep structural transformations. The Shiite-Sunni tension in Iraq, escalation of the influence of political Islamic movements in most Middle East's states, internal struggle in Lebanon, problems of the Yemeni government's weakness of its frequent conflict with Huthi rebel forces, collapse of the Somali state due to internal strife and foreign interventions, together with what happens in Sudan, the tense positions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. All these incidents formed a complicated picture of threat in the Middle East. Another change happened in the number of international powers that militarily, politically and economically intensified their presence in the region, intervening in its security and affecting its stability. Examples are escalation of Chinese, Japanese and Indian interest in the region, and increase of the NATO's role there.
Deterioration of security positions in Iraq before the parliamentary elections in January 2010.
These developments convinced Riyadh and Damascus of the importance of cooperation between them. It seems that there is a reconciliation process that developed during 2008-2009. The Saudi Foreign Minister reiterated: "We do not seek to isolate Syria or harm it. All the Arab states are interested to have Syria in the framework of Arab common action". Syria reciprocated the appeasement signals with Saudi Arabia, and that helped to conclude the Doha's Lebanese Agreement in May 2008.
After the Lebanese elections in June 2009 a clear Saudi-Syrian conciliation was evident in the direct political dialogue. The conciliation steps were complete with King Abdullah's visit to Damascus in 6 and 8 October 2009. After one month of the visit Lebanon witnessed the formation of Saad El Hariri's government in 9 November 2009. However, it is not expected that the Saudi-Syrian rapprochement will change the Arab Order in general, although the polarization between the "Moderation" and the "Opposition's axis may retreat a bit.
As for the reflection on inter-Arab relations, there are two possible scenarios: either the status quo will persist or the inter-Arab relations will improve (even temporarily) to avoid a new stage of disintegration of the Arabs. This scenario may be viable due to improvement of democratic positions, ascendancy of new social, economic and political forces that realise that their interests will not be achieved but within of Arab cooperation. There are also possibilities that a third Palestinian Intifada (uprising) will create cohesion to the Palestinian cause, so that contradiction with occupation will replace current conflict between Palestinian organisations, together with failure of the American project in Afghanistan and Iraq, or at least its retreat that may return confidence to the Arab masses.
However, the scenario of improvement of inter-Arab relations will not be automatically realised, as it needs Arab forces to adopt it and exert effort to formulate the future. Accordingly there are some recommendations and conclusions as follows:
An effort be exerted to terminate the Arab cold war which takes the form of an unacceptable media and political attacks. It is obvious that escalation of the Israeli danger will increase Arab coordination on how to face Israeli policies, especially after Obama Administration's inability to pressure to stop Israeli settlements and prevent frequent incursions on the Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem.
The importance of expansion in the Saudi-Syrian rapprochement and enhancing the economic basis of inter-Arab political relations, in the hope that creating economic interests will strengthen Arab political ties.
The Arab states should immediately abandon the conflict policies between roles, and endeavours to monopolise the leadership post, and reject the idea of isolating any Arab party, for any reason.
There should be efforts to solve Arab differences from their roots, and not to appease them, so as to prevent their explosion once more.
Perhaps the Arab states are not able to prevent international powers to launch a war against Iran, but building Arab states that are based on fear from Iran or exaggeration in suspecting Shiite dominance in the whole region can not be considered a positive or effective Arab policy. The components of this policy is confined to abort the project of other parties, but does not give an answer to features of the future Arab strategy or nature of the Arab awakening project. As a whole the Arabs should explore points of inter-Arab agreement and maximize them, apart from differences between Arab and Iranian stances, instead of concentrating on deepening differences and spending efforts in inter-Arab conflicts that dissipate energies.
In this context, the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation will be part of solving the problem, but there is need to expand it to be a comprehensive Arab policy, especially in regard to reconciliation between Egypt and Syria. Nevertheless, the Arab Order will be in a better shape with the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation, and both states should maximize its outcomes and develop it to stop Arab current deterioration.